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CHAPTER I 
THE ROLE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY 
IN EDUCATION 
Introduction 
A new role of philosophy in education is to guide a reconstruc-
tion of the history of philosophy as well as a reconstruction of all of 
the educational disciplines on the basis of "the linguistic tum" which 
can be described as: the ontological attitude that only language exists, 
Taking "the linguistic tum" suggests a new criterion of meaning 
which displaces the empiricist criterion of meaning. Among the results 
of adopting this new linguistic attitude are: a new definition of 'man' ; 
a new distinction between science and the humanities; and a reinterpreta-
tion of the value and meaning of metaphysics, theology, and religion. 
A paradigm application of "the linguistic tum" in the founda-
tions of education can be shown by an analysis of the field of special 
education and of leaming disability in particular. 
The role of philosophy in education, apart :from history of phi-
losophy, has been the application of the "philosophical method" or "phi-
losophical attitude," This attitude consists in questioning implicit 
assumptions and in using language in a specifiably cautious manner. 
1 
2 
Some of the assumptions which might be questioned, for example, 
are value assertions such as 'Xis a valuable topic to include in the 
curriculum' • What is in question here, is the meaning of the term 'edu-
cationally valuable'. The recent humanist-materialist debate in curric-
ulum construction is evidence of the different meanings that can be 
attached to -this terrn.. 1 
The philosophical method further requires that we be forever 
circumspect in our use of language. Typical imperatives in this regard 
are: define terms unambiguously and avoid the logical fallacies. 
One of the legacies of philosophy to education and to human 
endeavor in general, can aptly be called "metaphysical semantics." Meta-
physical semantics is a way of extracting new meaning from language by 
taking a new ontological perspective. The concept of metaphysical seman-
tics blurs the classical distinction between epistemology and ontology. 
Epistemology is thereby regarded as the study of the meaning of language, 
and ontology is regarded as the description of designata in their rela-
tionship to signs. 
A Reinterpretation of Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
A brief review of the history of philosophy from this new vantage 
point demonstrates how the great philosophical systems can be reinterpre-
ted as disguised attempts to posit metaphysical-semantical theories, that 
is, as disguised recommendations to revise the use of language. 
1Herbert Feigl, "The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism," 
in Readin s in the Philoso h of Science, eds. Herbert Feigl and May 
Brodbeck New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 8-18. 
3 
Plato's eternal forms, for example, provided man with a new, but 
misleading, picture of the relationship between language and reality. 
Here the term 'reality' is to be defined from the perspective of meta-
physical semantics as 'that which language designates'. Plato's rec-
ommended revision of language was that terms be treated as though they 
had an essential meaning. 
Aristotle's categories strengthened the belief that we can even-
tually arrive at the "real" definition of terms, if we correctly apply 
the classification procedure of genus and differentia. 
'Ihe British Empiricists argued that our language is meaningful 
only insofar as our terms are based on sensation experiences, Hume's 
dictum to burn all in our libraries not based on this criterion of mean-
ing stands as testimony to the linguistic character of British Empiri-
cism. 
During contemporary times, three new language oriented, philo-
sophical outlooks are being assimilated into education: Logical Posi-
tivism, American Pragmatism, and Ordinary Language Analysis. 
Logical Positivism has renewed interest in the structure of lan-
guage. Its most perceptible influence on education has been in mathe-
matics and in science. Mathematics is now regarded as an abstract lan-
guage based on logic. 'Ihe use of the empiricist criterion of meaning in 
science has, at last, turned the course of science from the path of Aris-
totelian essentialism to the productive path of verificationism, 
4 
American Pragmatism has replaced the European monarchial, class-
room attitude of privileged access to knowledge with a democratic view 
which elevates the ontology of ordinary society to the highest level of 
philosophical acceptability. The contribution of pragmatism to philos-
ophy has been its analysis of language as a social phenomenon which is 
1 based on a communitarian ontology. 
Ordinary Language Analysis is the most recent entry into educa-
tion, but it has appeared almost exclusively at the theoretical level, 
in philosophical studies of education. Contemporary ordinary language 
analysts, such as Hirst and Peters, are attempting to redefine such 
terms as 'education' by analyzing the ordinary language used to describe 
the acts of teaching and learning. The result of such redefinition is 
to restrict the use of educational terminology to conform with ordinary 
use, 
It is thus possible to reconstruct the history of philosophy, 
from antiquity to contemporary times, in such a way that,given any :rhil-
~sophical system whatever, it can be reinterpreted to be a proposal to 
reform the use of language. According to this linguistic perspective: 
ethics concerns the meaning of 'good'; aesthetics concerns the meaning 
of 'beauty'; epistemology concerns the meaning of 'meaning'; logic is 
concerned with linguistic transformations; philosophy of science deals 
with the clarification of the various object languages used in science 
1Professor Robert Barry, Philosophical Lectures in American Pragma-
tism, Loyola University of Chicago, Fall Semester, 1975, 
5 
and the logico-empirical rules of inference used by scientists; and meta-
physics is the attempt to characterize the range of referents which lan-
guage can designate. Philosophy, therefore, is (and always has been) 
about language. 
According to the view of metaphysical semantics, we can stipu-
latively define the three contemporary philosophical systems as follows: 
pragmatism is the study of the bio-social basis of language, logical 
positivism is the study of language verification, and ordinary language 
analysis is the study of language criteriology, 
'!he Linguistic Turn 
It should be noted that throughout this study all propositions 
about language can be extended beyond verbal language to nonverbal lan-
guage, This extension has been called "semiotics" which is the study of 
sign process, Nonverbal languages would include the gestural languages 
used by animals and the symbolic language exhibited in the honeybee dance, 
The blind, deaf mute thus acquires a haptically based language of signs. 
In order for educators to effectively use linguistic philosophy, 
they must accept a linguistically based reconstruction of the history of 
philosophy. The value of this acceptance does not lie in its historical 
character, however, but in the new perspective suggested by the reinter-
pretation. This new vantage point will induce the habit of viewing all 
problems and educational disciplines as having an important linguistic 
component. The educator must, at times, behave as though only language 
exists. Accepting this perspective is to take "the linguistic tum." 
6 
What follows are numerous examples of making explicit thos~ as-
pects of educational disciplines which are linguistically based. 
Science 
(a) Materialism in science consists in the scientist adopting 
the material idiom while he is in the laboratory. He adopts the "thing 
language" as his linguistic framework because that particular mode of 
speaking has been most successful in prediction and postdiction. We 
must not take the scientist's use of the physicalist language as evi-
dence that he necessarily embraces materialism as an ontology, but rath-
er that he has decided to employ a way of speaking that is pragmatically 
useful. 
(b) '!he theory of relativity can be regarded as an attempt to 
redefine 'simultaneity' and 'congruence' in such a way that our ordinary 
definition of causality continues to apply as a description of events in 
noninertial frames of reference. 
(c) Assertions about theoretical entities such as forces, anti-
neutrinos, specific gravity, and solubility can be translated into ob-
servational predicates which refer to meter readings and so on. 
{d) In biology, statements about genes can be taken as shorthand 
expressions for probability statements about the likelihood of an off-
spring exhibiting a trait. 
Mathematics 
(a) Mathematics can be regarded as an instrument for making 
7 
explicit those aspects of empirical theories which are implicit in, the 
premises. Mathematics is thus an auxiliary calculus which assists us 
in making linguistic transformations within our empirical theories. 
(b) The "language" of mathematics (for example, field equations) 
is useful in describing empirical phenomena because mathematical and em-
pirical constructions exhibit many of the criteria of thinghood such as 
conservation and continuity. 
(c) Mathematics can also be viewed as a formal syntactical system 
that is composed of empty tautologies which are uninterpreted (meaning 
free). Mathematics is thereby regarded as a set of transformative rules 
of inference governing the conventions we use to replace one string of 
symbols with another. 
Psychology 
(a) Classical disputes in psychology need not be regarded as be-
ing about matters of fact, but can be considered to be disguised disa-
greements about alternative descriptions of matters of fact. For example, 
instead of arguing that there is no such thing as the subconscious, the 
disputant should stipulate, "We do not wish to use the phrase 'subcon-
scious thought' but prefer to reserve the word 'thought' for what Freud 
called 'conscious thought' • " 
(b) Philosophical psychology has revealed that statements about 
psychological states are tangles of linguistic confusions and that psy-
chological claims about emotions can be clarified by ordinary language 
8 
analysis. Typically, for example, psychologists reduce the statement 
'He is angry' to 'He is engaging in characteristic behavior' or 'He now 
has a tendency to behave in characteristic behavior' or 'He is undergo-
ing characteristic physiological processes'. The choice of reduction 
will vary depending on the school of psychology making the analysis. 
In any case, however, analyzing 'characteristic' is problematic 
because criteria for emotional states overlap and are not uniform. For 
example, one may fidget nervously and have hot flashes, not only when 
one is angry, but also when one wears woolen underclothes. Furthermore, 
anger may bring about pacing and feverishness in one person, but immo-
bility and cold shivers in another. 
Austin illuminated one of the difficulties in a behavioristic 
definition of psychological states by using the example of 'anger'. In 
his "Pretending" he concluded: 
I think it must on reflection be agreed that in whichever of the 
ways a man behaves it is open to us to say either 'He is angry' 
or 'He is only pretending to be angry', and that either statement 
can be in fact true, depending on the (other) circumstances of 
the case at least in addition to these features ••• 1 
If emotion is a feeling identifiable with physiological sensa-
tions, a subject could undergo an emotion only while he was undergoing 
sensations. For example, if John enjoys his chess game, we assume he 
is enjoying the entire game, not just those parts during which he is 
experiencing jolts of pleasure. Ryle saw that this claim entails an 
1J. L. Austin, "Pretending," in Essays in Philoso hical Ps cholo 
ed. Donald F. Gustafson (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964, p. 101. 
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infinite regress because we could ask of each pleasure sensation, "Was 
it pleasant?" He pointed out that to answer that it was pleasant would 
lead to a redundancy or worse: the same question could in turn be asked 
about this feeling, and so on ad infinitum. 1 
Moreover, if an emotion is a set of sensations then the strength 
of an emotion would be the same as the strength of the sensations in-
volved. 'Ihe most extreme emotions would be composed of violent sensa-· 
tions which could distradt us to the point of interfering with our ac-
tivities. On the contrary, extreme emotions frequently increase the 
efficiency of the subject in his activities. Would a pianist's great 
pleasure in playing his favorite concerto, for example, ever interfere 
with his playing as a toothache might? Bedford maintained that emotion 
words such as 'anger' are not the names of sets of sensations. He in-
sisted, for example, that angry men feel no specific anger feelings as 
such, nor do we need to experience any feelings at all in order to be 
2 
angry. 
'Ihese examples illustrate that behavioral descriptions and phys-
iological descriptions of psychological states are amenable to linguis-
tic analysis. 
1Gilbert Ryle, "Pleasure," in Essa sin Philosophical Psycholo y, 
ed. Donald F. Gustafson (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964, p. 19. 
2Errol Bedford, "Emotions," in Essays in Philoso hical 
ed. Donald F. Gustafson (New York: Doubleday & Co., 19 4, 
10 
Hwnanities 
(a) One of the characteristics which uniquely distinguishes the 
humanities :from science is language use. The language of science is de-
notative; that is, free of any dependence on figura.tive language. In 
scientific assertion, synonymous substitution does not affect meaning. 
This is not the case in poetry, for example. Merely substituting syno-
nyms for words in a poem will not reproduce the original meaning of the 
poem. 
(b) Unlike science, the humanities provide a direct vehicle :for 
self-expression; that is, the idiom of the humanities allows the asser-
tion of one's personality in the medium of his production. 
(c) Metaphor is the omnipresent principle of the humanities. 
Without the metaphoric use of language, it would be impossible for man 
to express the ideas that matter most to him. 
Religion 
Antony Flew and others have argued that religious assertions 
8Uch as 'God exists' and 'There is life after death' are meaningless 
because such statements are unverifiable. According to this criticism, 
the meaning of a statement consists in the ways in which the statement 
is verified, For example, the meaning of 'This table is five feet long' 
can be found in the operations used in determining whether the state-
ment is true or false, 
Flew challenged anyone to describe the test conditions by which 
religious statements could be verified (confirmed) or falsified (dis-
confirmed) • 1 
In answer to Flew's challenge, it can be shown that some reli-
gious statements are verifiable, that is, descriptions of test condi-
tions can be generated which would confirm or falsify some religious 
t . 2 asser ions. 
11 
"' Consider the statement ' (name) is God'. A substitution in-
stance might be 'Jones is God', or 'Aton is God', or 'Jesus is God'. 
What test conditions would confirm or disconfirm the assertion 'Jones 
is God'? 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
An example verification-reduction set could be: 
J. performs benevolent acts. 
J. does not perform malevolent acts. 
J. asserts that he is God. 
J. performs amazing feats such as waking up corpses, feeding 
multitudes of hungry people with a small quantity of food, 
curing blindness, walking on water, and so on. 
e. J. performs his amazing feats without the mediation of illu-
sions, deceptions, drugs, relief of psychosomatic illness, 
floatation devices, hypnosis, hysteria, and so on. 
1 An tony Flew, "'Iheology and Falsification, " in 'Ihe Existence of God, 
ed. John Hick (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 225-227. 
2Although John Hick was able to establish a set of testable reduc-
tion sentences for ''Ihere is life after death', his results were restric-
ted in that his proposed reduction set was only confirmable but not falsi-
fiable. He argued ad hoc, however, that a statement can be verifiable 
without being falsifiable, for example, ''!here are three successive 7's 
in the decimal expansion oflf'. John Hick, "'Iheology and Verification," 
'Ihe Existence of God, pp. 253-273. 
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'!he point of this rebuttal to Flew is that theological-religious 
statements per se cannot be ruled out of court ab initio on the grounds 
that they are unverifiable. Even if we accept the strict verification-
ist criterion of meaning, Flew's criticism is simply in error. 
Without restriction, however, the empiricist criterion of mean-
ing cannot be taken seriously but must be qualified as follows: 
1. 'Ihe meaning of an empirical statement about theoretical enti-
ties is equivalent to the meaning of its corresponding "test-
able" (in the Carnapian sense) reduction sentences, 
2. A statement has denotative meaning only if it can be reduced 
to observational predicates, but its original meaning may not 
be equivalent to that of the reduction. 
It should be noted that the above restrictions constitute a proposed 
reformation of the use of language, 'Iherefore, these restrictions are 
as unverifiable as the original empiricist criterion of meaning. ('Ihe 
previous statement is a remark about the philosophical grammar of mean-
ing criteria, ) 
'!he first restriction alludes to a recent revision in the empir-
icist criterion of meaning as formulated by Carnap. Accordingly, dispo-
sition terms such as 'soluble' can be defined by stating the test condi-
tions (and positive test results) for which a space-time point could be 
described as exhibiting that property, for example, 'if x is placed in 
water then, xis soluble if and only if x dissolves'. Such reductions 
have been aptly called "test-conditions-test-results conditionals. 111 
1Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," in Readings in the Philos-
ophy of Science, eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 52-55. 
13 
'!he first restriction is a more acceptable formulation of the 
verifiability principle because terms which name theoretical entities 
are, in fact, shorthand expressions for test-conditions-test-results 
conditionals. '!his formulation of the empiricist criterion of meaning 
represents a tautology. In this form, the empiricist criterion of mean-
ing is not empirically verifiable and, therefore, meaningless in the 
strict positivist sense. From a formalist point of view, however, the 
formulation can be regarded as a metalinguistic transformative rule: 
having a meaning equivalent to its use. 
'!he second restriction establishes the condition that since 
language is lea:r:ned through public-social experiences, a (literal) 
statement has meaning only if it has public criteria for use. '!his 
study seeks to apply this restriction, however, only to denotative uses 
of language and not to metaphoric uses. 
'!he second restriction avoids a methodological difficulty with 
the empiricist criterion of meaning because it merely states a necessary 
,..condition for denotative meaning, but does not make the reduction set 
equivalent to the intended meaning of the original statement. For ex-
ample, if one were to assert 'Grand.ma is in the sitting room, ' the 
assertion could reduce to: 
t 1 : If the lady· in the sitting room were fingerprinted, her prints 
would be the same as Granny's. 
t 2 : If the lady in the sitting room were asked for identification, 
she could produce a driver's license with Granny's name on it. 
In ordinary language circumstances, we find such reductions 
counter-intuitive. The speaker might protestt for example, "That's not 
at all what I meant! I was not even thinking about :fingerprints or a 
driver's license. Granny doesn't drive. I wouldn't think of finger-
printing her because she has arthritis in her fingers. ::he would be 
deeply offended by such outrageous conduct." 
Regardless of how comprehensive and cautious we are in generating 
empirical verification sets for an assertion, one could always ?bject, 
"That is not at all what I intended by my statement." By this analysis, 
we can only accept an empirical reduction set as a necessary condition 
for meaning, not as the meaning of the original statement. It is not be-
ing argued here that such reduction sets are useless, however. Test-
condi tion-test-resul t conditionals are useful to the empiricist in form-
ulating operational definitions so that hypotheses may be advanced and 
tested. 
Now, pressing the Jones analysis further, we might hypothesize 
~•that, indeed there are historical accounts of a Jones who realized test 
conditions (a) through (e) several hundred years ago, Now, 'Jones is 
God ' resembles 'Lincoln was shot.' because further verification entails 
an additional criterion: 
f. The written historical accounts about J, are true, accurate, 
and comprehensive, 
Regardless of the evidence in favor of (f), however, some degree 
of uncertainty may remain. Believing that Lincoln was shot, for example, 
15 
requires faith in historical records such as the news reports of the 
period, and faith in the veracity and accuracy of eye witnesses, and so 
on. '!he positivists have recognized that empirical assertions are never 
completely verified, although they may be completely confirmable or com-
1 pletely testable. 
'!he parallel of the Jones case to Christianity is, of course, 
not a matter of coincidence. Long ago, Isaias developed the following 
confirmation criteria for 'J. is God ': 
God himself will come and will save you, Then shall the eyes of 
the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf be unstopped, '!hen 
shall the lame man leap and the tongue of the dumb be free.2 
An observer later reported that these test conditions were realized, 
that is, each test predicate was not only observable, but observed: 
Go and report to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see, 
the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead 
rise, , , .3 
Therefore, skepticism related to the assertion 'Jesus is God.' 
involves either empirical doubts about criteria (e) and (f), or doubts 
about the reduction set being a sufficient confirmation basis for 'J. 
~ 
is God '• 
The second kind of skepticism involves the issue of convention-
alism, that is, it is a matter of convention how we stipulate an opera-
1Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," in Readings in the Philos-
ophy of Science, eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 84-86. 
2Isaias 35:4-6. 
3Matthew 11:3-6. 
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tional definition of an empirical predicate. For example, it is merely 
a matter of convention that we operationalize 'measuring this table top' 
as 'laying off a foot ruler x number of times along the length and width ' 
We could have specified metric measurement, or the use of surveyor's in-
struments, or even 'doing a rhumba across the table top', if we chose. 
Paradoxically, operational definitions are thus mixtures of conventional-
but-yet-not-arbitrary meaning criteria. 
The first mentioned skepticism rests on empirical grounds, not 
on logical or linguistic grounds. Christians, of course, set aside their 
empirical doubts, much as contemporaries generally set aside doubts that 
Lincoln was shot. 
It should be noted, that the rebuttal of Flew's criticism does 
not establish that: 
1. All religious/theological statements are true. 
2. No religious/theological assertion is self-contradictory. 
3. All religious/theological statements are meaningful. 
4. Established confirmation bases for empirically verifiable 
religious/theological assertions are acceptable to all persons. 
The rebuttal entails establishing only that some religious/theological 
claims are verifiable (meaningful in the logical positivist sense). 
'Ihe logical positivists and ordinary language analysts have been 
generally antireligious but not without a notable exception. In his 
Notebooks Wittgenstein remarked, 
To believe in a God means to understand the question about 
the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the 
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facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in a 
God means to see that life has a meaning,1 
A fragment from his Zettel reveals a linguistic basis for Wittgenstein's 
understanding of God: "'You can't hear God speak to someone else, you 
can hear Him only if you are being addressed,'--'Ihat is a grammatical 
k ,.2 remar • 
Metaphysics and 'Iheology 
Wittgenstein recognized that public accessibility is a necessary 
condition for learning (using) language. For Wi ttgenstej_n, part of the 
meaning of a statement is found in the speech act and within the form of 
life in which the utterance is made. For example, the meaning of 'Halt!' 
is embedded in the act of a sentry stopping an unauthorized intruder into 
a military compound, 'Ihe meaning partly arises in the military form of 
life, Part of our understanding of 'Halt!', therefore, involves under-
standing the use of the expression by a guard, the rationale for obey-
ing the order, the consequences of not obeying, and a host of other things, 
In short, we must understand the military 'language game" which Wittgen-
stein would describe as the philosophical grammar of 'Halt' • 
~ 
To understand the meaning of the word 'book' we must, therefore, 
not only understand the "naming language game" (the process of ostensi ve 
definition), but at least some of the companion public actions such as 
reading a book, bringing a book, turning the pages of a book, and so on. 
11udwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks, eds. G. H. van Wright and G. E. M. 
Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 74e. 
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (1928-1948), eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and 
G. H. van Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1967), p. 21e. 
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In short, we must have assimilated at least some of the public forms of 
life associated with book utilization. 
In spite of the supposed opposition between the Tractatus (log-
ical positivism) and the Investigations (ordinary language analysis), 
there is an obvious ingredient common to both: a public accessibility 
criterion for denotative language use. 'Ihe "simples" of the Tractatus 
were to be publicly observable and the criteria of the Investigations 
were to be public criteria. In view of this strong public accessibility 
doctrine, one would expect that Wittgenstein was forced to reject meta-
physics and theology (as most positivists and ordinary language analysts 
have done). 
We arrive now at a revelation of a different Wittgenstein, not 
the antimetaphysical critic, but the champion and protector of theology 
and metaphysics. 
It may be the case that some theological assertions are verifi-
able, but others are clearly not, for example, 'God is perfect '. Such 
statements have an obvious metaphysical character. Are such statements, 
therefore, meaningless? 
'.fhe difficulty with metaphysical statements arises from a limi-
tation of language itself, and since language is the vehicle of thought, 
our very thoughts suffer this same limitation. 
Wittgenstein has been interpreted, until recently, as arguing 
that language misleads philosophers and theologians into making meaning-
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less metaphysical statements. 
S. Morris Engel, however, has suggested a new view of Wittgen-
stein as revealed in what Engel calls "the dilemma of the Blue Book." 
Engel observes that it is one thing to claim that it is possible that 
philosophers are misled by language, but it is still another matter to 
claim that linguistic confusion must arise inevitably. Here Engel is al-
luding to the superficial appearance of a contradiction in the Blue Book. 1 
At times, Wittgenstein's dominant thesis seems to be that the 
source of philosophic confusion is language: language is the source of 
our philosophical perplexities and, therefore, language is the level at 
which the problems must be solved. At other times, Wittgenstein seems 
to hint at an entirely different thesis: " ••• we try to find a form of 
expression which fulfills a certain craving of the metaphysician which 
our ordinary language does not fulfill • • • and which produces • • • 
2 puzzlement." 
Engel believes that in such passages, Wittgenstein is suggesting 
that not all metaphysical perplexities are products of linguistic con-
fusion, but arise instead from a curious discontentment that the meta-
physician has with language itself.3 In a similar passage Wittgenstein 
declares: "Our ordinary language holds our mind.rigidly in one position, 
1s. Morris Engel, Witt enstein's Doctrine of the T 
An Historical and Critical Examination of His Blue Book 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 14-17. 
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 19.58), p. 55. 
3Thgel, Tyranny of Language, pp. 14-17. 
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as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having_ a 
desire for other positions as well. 111 Here we find Wittgenstein's doc-
trine of "the tyranny of language." Now he speaks not of a problem with 
the philosopher, but rather of a problem with language itself: language 
is confining and the metaphysician is forced to revise it. 
In summary, the dilemma of the Blue Book is that two differing 
theses seem to have been advanced by Wittgenstein: 
1. that language deceives the metaphysician into absurd doctrine 
2. that the metaphysician realizes that existing language is un-
able to express "certain things" and, therefore, he is forced 
to invent new usages to try to express them. 
If the second thesis is correct in asserting that the metaphysi-
cian is forced to revise language because of its constricting nature, 
then it does no good to show him how these expressions are actually used 
in ordinary language, since that is precisely what gives him discomfort. 
'Ihis second thesis implies that philosophical confusion sometimes runs 
deeper than language even though its symptoms are exhibited linguisti-
cally.2 
We know that Wittgenstein did not hold metaphysicians in contempt. 
Wittgenstein was, after all, a metaphysician himself. Once he remaiked 
to Drury: "Don't think that I despise metaphysics or ridicule it. On the 
contrary, I regard the great metaphysical writings of the past as among 
1Wittgenstein, Blue Book, p. 59. 
2 Ehgel, Tyranny of Language, pp. 14-17. 
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the noblest productions of the human mind. 111 
Wittgenstein's greatest accomplishment was to have recognized 
that because leaining language requires public criteria, its denotative 
use cannot describe those things which transcend the publicly observable. 
Language can describe that which is transcendent only figuratively. 
By this view all metaphysical assertions are metaphoric state-
ments and cannot be interpreted literally. Wittgenstein thus reserved 
the metaphoric use of language not only for the humanities, but for meta-
physics and theology as well. 
To summarize, Wittgenstein discovered that the relationship be-
tween language and reality, between God and man, cannot be stated liter-
ally but can only be hinted at indirectly in metaphoric language. Only 
metaphoric language can describe the transcendent. 
At this juncture, Christians would hasten to point out that much 
of what Christ said was spoken in parables. Was this style chosen because 
Christ spoke to simpletons who could only understand fables? Obscure, 
enigmatic allegories are hardly food for the simpleton. An alteinative 
explanation is that Christ had no choice except to speak in the only idiom 
available to designate the transcendent world. 
Wittgenstein's contribution was to reveal a division of labor in 
language which appropriates the denotative use of language to science; 
and the metaphoric use to metaphysics, theology, religion and the arts. 
1Ibid., p. 37. 
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Whenever a person uses denotative language when he should be 
using metaphoric language, he is doomed to utter nonsense. 'Ihat is the 
doctrine of the tyranny of language. Language legislates a different 
use depending on whether the referents to be designated are publicly 
accessible or transcendent. 'Ihe tyrant's decree is "Wovon man nicht 
sprechen kann, darii'ber muss man schweigen. 111 
Under this interpretation, assertions in metaphysics and theol-
ogy can be regarded as paraverifiable but yet not meaningless. Instead 
of linguistic philosophy being the roadblock to metaphysics, it can be 
its triumphal arch back into philosophy and education. 
A New Definition of 'Man' 
Even the definition of 'man' can be stipulated in terms of lan-
guage characteristics. Mead, the American pragmatist, was the first to 
suggest this new definition. Although Mead recognized that many biolog-
ical species use language (signs), he realized: only man understands his 
own utterances. 
For Mead, the self, mind, and consciousness of man arise simul-
taneously through the process of linguistic social experience. 'Ihe self, 
mind, and consciousness are not present at birth (except potentially), 
but develop out of the process of language acquisition. '!he self begins 
1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. 
Pears and B. F. McGuinness, with an Introduction by Bertrand Russell 
(New York: The Humanities Press, 1961), p. 150. The famous seventh prop-
osition traditionally thought to be a censure of metaphysics can be re-
interpreted as a pronouncement to science (and metaphysics). 
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to develop when the human organism acquires the use of social gestures 
which have become "significant symbols," Man becomes a self as soon as 
he is able to interpret and anticipate the meaning of his own gestures. 
For Mead, "the internalized conversation of gestures constitutes think-
. ,,1 1ng. 
Mead does not limit communication to vocal gestures, however, 
"There is the language of speech and the language of hands and the lan-
guage of the expression of the countenance. 112 
Although many species have achieved communication of gestures, 
only man has taken an additional leap up the evolutionary ladder. Only 
man can understand his own gestural utterances, According to Mead, a 
dog snarls and other dogs "understand" this snarling, but the snarling 
dog does not understand his own snarl. The growling dog is thus emit-
ing a vocal gesture' (symbol), but is not being controlled or affected 
by it. 3 
The self emerges only when the emitted gestures become under-
stood by the organism emitting them, that is, when what we are going to 
do is controlling what we are doing. 4 For example, to yell "Fire!" in a 
crowded theater upon smelling smoke is merely an automatic response, not 
a significant symbol, unless the vocal gesture "Fire!" affects the speak-
er as it affects others. "Fire!" becomes a significant symbol when the 
1George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. and with an Introduc-
tion by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 
p. 1_56. 
2Ibid,, p, 147. 3Ibid,, p. xx. 4rbid., p. xxi. 
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urge to emit this symbol is controlled by the speaker because of his un-
derstanding of the meaning of the symbol. "The effect on himself of 
what he is about to say checks him; there is here a conversation of ges-
tures between the individual and himself. 111 
During this inner conversation of symbols, "the individual ex-
periences himself • • • from the generalized standpoint of the social 
group as a whole to which he belongs. 112 Here Mead is focusing on what 
is necessary to the existence of the self: 
The organized community or social group which gives to the 
individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other." 
• • • only by taking the attitude of the generalized other toward 
himself, ••• can he think at all; for only thus can thinking--
the inte:rnalized conversation of gestures--occur.3 
Mead believed that only man has made this transition from im-
pulse to rationality. His explanation for man's uniqueness is that only 
the human organism has the neurological makeup necessary to undergo this 
qualitative change: ". • • the self reaches its full development through 
the mechanism of the central nervous system, , • , 114 
Mead's analysis of social language as the very substance of 
thought is brought to mind when we review the experiences of Helen Keller. 
At the age of seven, Helen became aware of significant symbols and of the 
"naming language game" (that signs can designa:te objects). The force of 
these discoveries changed her from a "dumb" animal to a thinking, human 
self. Helen described her experiences as follows: 
1Ibid., p. 141. 
4Ibid., p, 1_58. 
2Ibid I , p. 1.38. 3Ibid., pp. 154-1_56. 
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As the cool water gushed over one hand she spelled into the 
other the word "water" first slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, 
my whole attention fixed upon the motion of her fingers. 
Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness ••• and somehow the 
mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew then that "w-a-t-e-r" 
meant the wonderful, cool something that was flowing over my hand. 
That living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy, set it 
free, • I left the wellhouse eager to learn. Everything had a 
name, and each name gave birth to a new thought.1 
The words of Helen Keller thus stand as a testimony revealing the rela-
tionship between language, thought, and the self. 
From Mead's point of view regarding the distinction between man 
and other animal species, the "talking apes" do not have a self and thus 
are qualitatively different from man. The chimpanzee, "Washoe," for 
example, may have been conditioned to automatically use signs denota-
tively, but there is no evidence that Washoe's behavior is controlled 
by her own "utterances." Her signs do not appear to be "significant." 
According to this view, the talking apes do not have internalized, ego-
centric speech. 
The transformational grammarian, McNeil, also doubts that Washoe 
has acquired genuine human language because of syntactical "peculiari-
ties" exhibited by the chimpanzee: "I find much room for doubt that the 
chimpanzee has learned to use genuine words. 112 He notes that all at-
tempts to teach primates to "speak" have "failed dismally. ,,J 
1Helen Keller, The Story of My Life (New Yo:rk: Dell Publishing Co., 
1961), p. 34. 
2David McNeil, The Ac uisition of Lan ua e: The Stud of Develo ment-
al Psycholinguistics New York: Harper & Row, 1970 , p. 54. 
3rbid. 
r 
! 
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Although Piaget and others have suggested that thought does not 
require language, the Russian linguists, most notably Vygotsky and Luria, 
t th t th ght d d 1 . . t• 1 insis a ou epen s on anguage acqu1s1 ion. 
Wittgenstein, who has the unique distinction of giving impetus 
to two contemporary philosophical systems, logical positivism and ordinary 
language analysis, also contended that in order to think, the thinking 
subject must have language. 
Until recently, the interpretations.of Wittgenstein relied almost 
exclusively upon the Tractatus and the Investigations. Within the last 
decade, however, Wittgenstein's other works, more recently published, 
have become regarded as most important because they reveal a bridge across 
Wittgenstein's seemingly opposing views as represented by logical posi-
tivism (the Tractatus) and ordinary language analysis (the Investigations). 
In his Blue Book and Zettel, for example, Wittgenstein analyzed 
the relationship among mind, language, meaning, and thought. His analy-
sis is noticeably different from the theme of the Tractatus or of the 
Investigations. Some of his main arguments may be summarized as follows: 
1. Philosophers are misled into believing that there are occult 
processes such as thinking, hoping, and wishing which are inde-
pendent of the processes of expressing thoughts, hopes, and 
wishes: "Testimony ••• cannot convince one that it is possi-
ble to think without a language. 112 
1Ibid. , p. 126. 
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (1928-1948), eds. G .• E. M. Anscombe and 
G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifoxnia Press, 1967), p. 21e. 
2. The mind is not an agent in the same way that the hand is an 
agent in writing. This way of speaking is only a metaphor. 
To say otherwise, is to be misled by our mistaken belief that 
all nouns must have referents in the denotative sense: "One of 
the most dangerous ideas ••• is that we think with our heads 
or in our heads. 111 
3. What is the real meaning of a word? Whatever meaning we give 
to it, and some words literally have thousands of meanings 
(uses). 
Clearly, Wittgenstein's position is that thinking requires language and 
that thoughts are not mental images in one's head. 
The Reunification of Curriculum 
If it is difficult to classify the various educational disci-
plines, it is so because the process of classifying and compartmental-
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izing education is itself artificial. Is the definition of 'man' within 
the realm of biology or the humanities? Is religion a part of history or 
theology (or perhaps metaphysics, philosophy, logic, or psychology)? 'Ihe 
barriers among disciplines were erected long ago, most formally by Aris-
totle. Although many modeni. educators have sensed the error of separa-
tism in curriculum, it has been difficult to philosophically justify re-
unification. 
It is clear that there are pragmatic advantages to specialization 
or depth knowledge in a specific discipline. Also, the overpowering ad-
vent of the "knowledge explosion" requires that we organize and select 
1Ibid., p. 105e. 
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our reception of information. At the same time, however, many concerns 
are beginning to emerge related to man's imbalanced diet of knowledge. 
We have become more aware of the interrelatedness of our problems, 
especially in politics, ecology, ethics, economics, and technology. '!he 
new perspective in medicine of "wholistic heal th care" gives testimony to 
the value of integrating the various disciplines in the solution of our 
problems. 
We are now faced with the most awesome problems that have ever 
confronted mankind. 'Ihese new problems are cataclysmic in their conse-
quences because for the first time in history their outcome will deter-
mine whether man will vanish from "spaceship earth" in a final nuclear 
or ecological convulsion. 
As Plato saw the need for philosophical vision in government, 
we must apprehend the value of philosophical vision in education. 'lllis 
new, unitary perspective must be inculcated in students, teachers, and 
administrators. Only then will education produce the most appropriate 
framework for tomorrow's solutions. 
Is there a strand of unity that runs through the multidisci-
plinary, educational fabric? The thesis herein advanced is that phil-
osophy, and especially linguistic philosophy, is that reunifying thread. 
Once we have made the linguistic turn in philosophy and in education, we 
will be able to see that all things are related through language, and 
that curriculum can be reconstructed on a new metalinguistic foundation. 
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This work is attempting to illuminate a reinterpretation of phil-
osophy and education, which makes language the central axis. Language 
would thus gain a metaphysical significance in philosophy and in educa-
tion: that language is the very essence of man, of man's relationship to 
his God, of science, and of the arts. 
The Function of Philosophy in Etlucation 
The question concerning the role of philosophy in education can 
now be answered. 
First, reconstructed philosophy and especially linguistic phil-
osophy must become an important part of the curriculum at every level so 
that the learner will discover a unity in his diverse world. This uni-
versal perspective must become a principal aim of education. 
Even if this idealistic goal were not reached, there is new evi-
dence that the teaching of philosophy, in itself, may be instrumental in 
yielding advances in basic academic skills. For example, in 197.5 the 
Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (Montclair State 
College) completed experimental research which demonstrates that elemen-
tary age school children who are taught philosophy make significant gains 
in reading and in critical thinking skills, as well as highly significant 
gains with respect to interpersonal relationships. 1 
111Resul ts of 197.5 Experimental Research in Philosophy for Children," 
(Mimeographed). See also Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and 
Frederick S. Oscanyan, Pnilosophy in the Classroom (West Caldwell, N. J.: 
Universal Diversified Services, 1977). 
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'Ihe improvement of the experimental group in language was most 
dramatic. 'Ihe children in the experimental classes gained an average of 
eight months over the control group. One class gained a year and four 
months, and another advanced two and a half years. 1 
Secondly, the curriculum should be reconstructed intradisciplin-
arily and interdisciplinarily. Within each subject linguistic aspects 
should be made explicit, and the various disciplines should be reorgan-
ized according to metalinguistic relationships. 
'Ihirdly, the value and meaning of theology, religion, metaphys-
ics, and the humanities should be reassessed (as well as parascientific 
phenomena such as intuition, religious experience, and psychic experi-
ence). 
Finally, educational problems should be approached from a lin-
guistic standpoint including the application of ordinary language analy-
sis, verificationism, and the linguistic turn. 
Now that the new role of linguistic philosophy in education has 
been proposed, what must follow is a demonstration of a paradigm appli-
cation of this new role. 
CHAPTER II 
THE THEORY OF LEARNING DISABILITY: 
A PRE-SCIENCE 
Bertrand Russell once described philosophy as "speculation about 
matters where scientific knowledge is not yet possible. "1 According to 
Russell's view, one of the services of philosophy is to formulate prob-
lems so that they can be handed over to science in a science-acceptable 
form. The formulation process serves to clarify the problem so that it 
becomes more amenable to the scientific method. 
There are many problems in foundations of education that are in 
need of clarification. One such problem is represented by the question: 
"How does one learn?" Recently, many advances are beginning to appear 
in the areas of behaviorism, neurophysiology, psycholinguistics, .and la.n-
guage acquisition theory which promise to shed considerable light on the 
problem. 
The behaviorists, however, have implicitly reformulated the 
question as "What are the extemal, publicly accessible aspects of learn-
ing?" and the neurologists have revised the question to "What cen tra.l 
1Bertrand Russell, Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, comp. The Hearst 
Corporation (New York: Hearst Corporation, 1960), p, 9. 
31 
32 
nervous system activities and structures are necessary conditions for 
learning?" 
One of the functions of philosophy is to make such implicit re-
formulations explicit so that it becomes clear which derivative question 
is really being addressed by science and how this reformulation differs 
from the original question. For example, to what extent does the answer 
to the question "What central nervous system activities and structures 
are necessary conditions for learning?" answer the question ''How does 
one leam?" 
A companion question to ''How does one learn?" is "What prevents 
one from learning?" and this second question has received much more at-
tention than its consort for at least two reasons. 
First, in the United States educators find themselves confronted 
by the challenge of "universal education." American education has been 
based on an assumption that all children can learn and that education is 
for everyone. In America, education is valued because it is regarded as 
an instrument for the maintenance of democracy. As a result of adopting 
mass education we are frequently faced with students who have difficulty 
learning. 
Second, there has recently developed a legal movement in the 
United States to "mainstream" "exceptional" children. Here 'exceptional' 
means educationally handicapped and 'mainstream' means educate within 
the normal peer group environment. This movement has been brought about 
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by legislation on behalf of exceptional children and by litigation sur-
rounding special education. 
In 1975 the Etlucation of All Handicapped Children Act, as signed 
by President Ford, became the law of the land. This law requires equal 
educational opportunities for all exceptional children regardless of the 
severity of their leaniing handicaps. Under this law, all educationally 
handicapped children must be provided a free, public education in the 
least restrictive environment; that is, they are to be educated with 
their normal peer group as much as possible. 1 
'Ihe famous Bro'Wn Case of 1954 established the precedent that 
"separate is not equal" not only as related to race but to every social 
category. The courts now interpret the "separate is not equal" doctrine 
as applying to educationally handicapped children. 2 
Until the last decade, exceptional children were most often 
placed in "special education" institutions or in "special" classrooms. 
In the Mill Case of 1972, a class action suit was brought against a 
school board on behalf of all handicapped children. 'Ihe case was won 
in favor of exceptional children. The court decreed that children 
forced into special education placements were being deprived of their 
civil rights. F.ach year additional litigation is being won on behalf 
of exceptional children and being lost by those who espouse a separatist 
philosophy of special education.3 
1Thomas N. Fairchild and Ferris O. Henson, Mainstreaming Exceptional 
Children (Austin, Texas: Leaniing Concepts Inc, , 1976) , p. 57, -------... .... 
2 'L ... t\S 'TOWf:/i). 
Ibid., p. _58, -'lbid., p. 59, ~'1"' ~ 
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Now that the problem of educating handicapped children has be-
come the responsibility of local boards of education, the question 
"What prevents one from learning?" has taken on a new urgency. 'Ihe 
answer to this question will indirectly provide an answer to its com-
panion question "How does one learn?" Hence, there is a double motive 
for exploring this problem. 
types: 
Etlucational handicaps are considered to be of six different 
1. behavioral disorders such as schizophrenia 
2. physical handicaps such as visual impairments, deafness, and 
muscular dystrophy 
3. profound brain damage 
4. mental retardation (operationally defined as IQ below 80) 
5. environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantage 
6. learning disability; that is, leaming problems not listed 
above 
An analysis of the last category, "leaming disability," will 
have paradigmatic value because many of the problems surrounding the 
concept of learning disability are shared by the other labels. 
The problem of "What is a learning disability?" is especially 
amenable to philosophical investigation because of the newness of the 
field of learning disability (1960-65). The study of learning disabil-
ity is in a prescientific stage of development, characteristically laden 
with confused definition, competing models, and inconsistent practices. 
As recently as February 1976, for example, researchers have shown 
that the most frequently used tests to identify learning disabled chil-
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dren are, in fact, unable to differentiate between normal and learning 
disabled children. 1 
The tasks at hand in this field are clarification, definition, 
hypothesis formulation, validation of premises, and the postulation of a 
productive ontology--all philosophical activities. The next chapters of 
this work are devoted to accomplishing these tasks. 
1
ste:phen C. Larsen, Dorothy Rogers, and Virginia Sowell, "The Use of 
Selected Perceptual Tests in Differentiating between Normal and Learning 
Disabled Children," Journal of Learning Disabilities 9 (February 1976):85. 
CHAPTER III 
A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE DEFINITIONS 
AND MODELS OF LEARNING DISABILITY 
Introduction 
In this chapter the de jure definition of 'lea:ming disability' 
will be criticized along with the de facto definition commonly used by 
practitioners in the field of special education. Finally, three com-
peting models of explanation for learning disability will be examined 
and will be evaluated on the basis of their efficacy in remediating the 
problem of learning disability. 
The De Jure Definition 
In the Eiucation for All Handicapped Children Act, Congress de-
fined 'children with learning disability' as follows: 
Those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic 
psychological processes involved in understanding or in using lan-
guage, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in im-
perfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do 
mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such conditions 
as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, 
dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. Such term does not include 
children who have lea:ming problems which are primarily the result 
of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of 
emotional disturbance, or environmental, cultural, or economic dis-
advantage.1 
1Federal Register 41 (November 29, 1976):52404. 
J6 
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As it stands, the federal definition is a tangle of conceptual 
confusion arising from defects in its extensionality, consistency, and 
operational translatability. 
Extensional problems exist in the definition because its lan-
guage creates uncertainty as to whether a given child is a member of 
the set of children designated by the definition. For example, "imper-
feet ability" is a description which admits every member of the human 
race into the extension of the definition. Furthermore, many of the 
component descriptors defy exact definition. For example, there are 
now over twenty different definitions of the term 'dyslexia', thirty-
eight different terms used synonymously with 'learning disability', 
and over one hundred symptoms attributed to children given the label 
"learning disabled. 111 
Consistency problems exist in the definition because some parts 
of the definition qualify certain subjects as learning disabled while 
other parts of the definition disqualify these same subjects. For ex-
ample, the definition includes "perceptual handicaps" at the same time 
~ 
as it excludes "visual" and "hearing" handicaps. .Also, when the defi-
nition includes perceptual handicaps but excludes mental retardation, 
the implication is that mentally retarded children could not have per-
ceptual problems (learning disabilities) in addition to their "IQ prob-
lem." 
1Terry West and Carol Millsom, ''Learning Disabilities Funding," Eliu-
cational Leadershi Journal of the Association for Supervision and Cur-
riculum Development 32 May 1975 :507. 
r 
The federal definition, at one moment includes children 'Who have 
brain injury but at the next moment it excludes children with learning 
problems "primarily the result of • • • environmental or economic disad-
vantage." This implies that the two sets of children, thus designated, 
are disjoint. What is the status of a child who was brain damaged as a 
result of environmental factors or economic factors? Does the child 
qualify for the services of the learning disability program? How is 
the educator to determine whether a child's brain injury resulted from 
environmental or economic circumstances? 
Operational problems exist in the definition because parts of 
the definition imply that the educator is to identify learning disabled 
children by etiological classification, for example, "brain injury • • • 
minimal brain dysfunction," and "not • • • the result of • • • environ-
mental, cultural, or economic disadvantage." Definitions couched in 
terms of causes rather than publicly observable effects are difficult 
to operationalize. 
Definition 'Which prescribes identification through etiology ra-
ther than through syndrome is most appropriate for two audiences: 
1. specialists who are searching for causation in order to remove 
or prevent those causes 
2. specialists who have a treatment available for the identified 
cause of a malady 
From the point of view of the educator, however, neither one of 
these circumstances prevails. Unfortunately, there is no etiological 
r 
39 
"cure" for learning disability at the disposal of the educator. Further, 
the function of the educator is not to search for etiology since he does 
not have the scientific expertise for such a venture. 
Furthermore, an etiological definition does not generate an edu-
cational prescription for remediation. For example, a child being "min-
imaJ..ly brain damaged" operationalizes to a dysrhythmic EEG. Apart from 
the impracticalities involved in obtaining EEC's, verification of actual 
brain damage must wait until an autopsy reveals a cortical lesion. What 
should the educator do with the so-called "brain damaged child" until the 
postmortem? The entire mystique of the EEC in education can be discarded 
on the grounds that the EEC is educationally fruitless in relation to 
remediation. 
Taking the view of the behaviorist would give clearer direction 
for remediation of learning disability because this view overcomes some 
of the operational difficulties by focusing on effect rather than cause. 
For example, knowing that a child has a specific problem with morphology 
is more useful to the educator in terms of educational prescription than 
knowing that the child exhibits evidence of "organici ty. 11 
The illogic of adopting the medical model of etiology in the 
field of learning disability consists in the fact that there is no known 
medical therapy for specific learning disability. Further, there is 
growing evidence that no neurophysiological disorder corresponds to this 
diagnosis. Until further medical research confirms a neurophysiological 
basis for leaming disability, minimal brain dysfunction may be ~egarded 
r 
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by educators as a fiction. 
'!he many defects in the federal definition of lea:rning disability 
are becoming more evident as practitioners struggle to interpret it. The 
Bureau for the Etlucation of the Handicapped (BEH) now admits that "the 
state of the art in the field of lea:rning disability ••• is such that 
it is not presently possible to specify exactly" what a lea:rning disa-
bility is. 1 
What are the consequences of confused definition? First, with-
out clear definition, accurate identification is almost impossible. For 
example, the incidence of learning disability can range from one percent 
to as high as twenty percent, depending only on how the educator decides 
2 to define the tem. Therefore, the educator can never be reasonably 
certain which children are learning disabled, that is, which children 
need specialized assistance. 
Secondly, confused definition leads to confused diagnosis and 
prescription. As a result, the educator is hampered in the development 
of intervention strategies and materials. 
Finally, because of the enormous confusion that now exists in 
the profession conce:rning the meaning of 'learning disability', 
1Federal Register 41 (November 29, 1976):52404. 
2 Eleanor T. Kenney, "Learning Disability: What It Is and Is Not," 
Educational Leadershi Jou:rnal of the Association for Su ervision and 
Curriculum Development 32 May 197 5 : 507. 
In virtually eve-:ry kind of setting • • • the LD teachers report 
that they and their colleagues are frequently plagued with con-, 
siderable doubts about the meaning, or even the validity of their 
professional activities.1 
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With great uncertainty, the school administrator is thus forced to de-
fend to his clients the legitimacy of a vague, specialized service given 
to a nebulous group of children by often insecure and uncertain, special-
ist teachers. 
Clearly, what is needed is a revision in the de jure definition, 
The arguments to be presented will attempt to establish the following 
revision as a better definition of 'children with learning disability' 
(or more accurately, as a better description of children with lea:rning 
disability): those children who have a disorder in the process involved 
in understanding or in using language. This proposal will have the ef-
feet of taking 'learning disability' to mean semiotical disorder. 'Ihe 
proposed definition is a natural consequence of adopting the linguistic 
turn. 
The De Facto Definition 
Because of the confusion surrounding the de jure definition of 
lea:rning disability, educators have been forced to adopt a "common sense" 
definition of learning disability. From the educational practitioner's 
point of view, a child has a lea:rning disability if, in spite of his 
apparent "ability," the child does not "achieve" well academically, 
1cerald M. Senf, Anthony H. Luick, and Beverly P. Sawyer, "State 
Initiative in Lea:rning Disabilities: Illinois' Project SCREEN," Jou:rnal 
of Lea:rning Disabilities 8 (November 1975):.588. 
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At the schoolhouse level, t?e following criterion has been gen-
erally ad.opted for identifying learning disability: 
a significant discrepancy between a child's actual performance on 
standardized achievement tests and his expected performance based 
on IQ. 
For example, we would expect a child with "normal" ability (IQ = 100) to 
score at an obtained grade level of 5.5 on an achievement test, if he 
were in the middle of the fifth grade. But let us suppose that his ac-
tual performance is only 1. 5 (in terms of grade equivalent), then the 
percent discrepancy between his expected performance (EP) and his ac-
tual performance (AP) is: 
or 
EP - AP X 100 = % discrepancy EP 
5
·
5 
-
1
•
5 x 100 = 73% 5,5 
'!his criterion has become so popular among practitioners in the 
field of learning disability that one of its versions has become absorbed 
into HEW's proposed rules and regulations for implementing the Eliucation 
for All Handicapped Children Act. The proposed regulations further stip-
ulate that in order to be considered severe enough to qualify as learn-
ing disability, the discrepancy must be greater than or equal to fifty 
percent. 1 
One of the problems with this kind of de facto, operational def-
inition is that, regardless of the numerical threshold assigned to 'se-
vere discrepancy', that critical assignment is arbitrary. 
1Federal Register 41 (November 29, 1976):52407. 
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Another difficulty with the de facto definition of leaming 
disability is its inherent dependence on the disputed IQ measure. If, 
for example, IQ critics are correct in their claim that existing ability 
tests are merely achievement tests in disguise, then the discrepancy cri-
terion is invalid because the so-called "ability-performance" discrepancy 
is not actually a discrepancy between ability (expected achievement based 
on IQ) and performance since IQ tests, by this criticism, do not really 
measure "ability. " 
In order to avoid the problems associated with the de facto def-
inition of leaming disability, most educational practitioners ultimately 
rely on "clinical judgment" as an additional, deciding criterion. Intro-
ducing subjectivity into the identification process, however, creates an 
additional difficulty: whether a child is determined to be leal'.Iling dis-
abled will now depend on the idiosyncracies of the evaluating team. 1 
Because of the ultimate subjectivity of the referral and identi-
fication process, there is a danger that any child showing "unacceptable" 
behavior may be labelled "LD." Leaming disability may thus become a 
verbal cloak (resulting, for example, from ego defense) under which lies 
the teachers' failures. Kirk and Elkins have revealed, for example, 
that children are commonly misidentified as leaming disabled when, in 
fact, they are simply children who are failing in their school work due 
1Lloyd M. Dunn, "Special Etlucation for the Mildly Retarded: Is Much 
of It Justifiable?," in An Em irical Basis for Chane in Etlucation, ed. 
Wesley C. Becker (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1971 , p. 45. 
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to causes other than learning disabilities. 1 
Competing Models and Their Efficacy in Remediation 
Underlying the definitional confusion related to the concept of 
learning disability is a proliferation of models of explanation for 
learning disability. The existing explanations for learning disability 
can be classified into three general types: 
1. central nervous system disorder 
2. perceptual handicap 
J. input-output channel disorders 
The neurological model explains that, in a learning disabled 
child, learning is blocked by a dysfunction of the brain. Speaking in 
the physicalist idiom, the neurological model can be described as follows: 
Learning and memory are functions of patterns of neural connections 
in the central nervous system. Neurons (nerve cells) are physical-
ly separated. Brain activity involves a chemical-electrical activ-
ity among the neurons. These impulses are transmitted across the 
neural gaps by way of liquid hormonal bridges. These transmissions 
can be regarded as "information" much the same as modulated elec-
trical impulses in telephone wires and in computer circuits can be 
regarded as information. 2 
Research during the last decade indicates that oversimplified 
neurological explanations of learning, such as the explanation that lea:rn-
ing and memory are encoded onto large molecular structures in the brain, 
1Samuel A. Kirk and John Elkins, "Characteristics of Children En-
rolled in the Child Service Demonstration Centers," Journal of Learning 
Disabilities 8 (November 1975):630-637. 
2
rrving S. Bengelsdorf, "The Brain and Nervous System in Learning and 
Memory," The Eliucation Digest (December 1975), pp. 19-22. 
are unfo1.mded. There is no empirical evidence for the engram--the Holy 
Grail of psychology--corresponding, for example, to neural patterns which 
house the multiplication tables in the brain. 1 
The most remarkable result of the neurological model is not how 
much has been revealed by it, but how very little it has illuminated our 
understanding of the concept of learning as a function of neurophysiology. 
Bertrand Russell's quip, "If your head is cut off, it immensely diminish-
es your thinking power;•2 is representative of the present yield of infor-
mation from neurophysiology to educational practice. For example, al-
though it is now suspected that hormones released during emotional states 
may influence long-term or short-term memory, it is uncertain whether 
this hormonal release enhances or impairs memory.3 Furthermore, applied 
research in this area has been mainly conducted on infrahuman subjects, 
making the promise of possible classroom application rather remote. 
Among the many questions still to be answered are: 
1. To what extent is the pattern of neural interconnections 
determined by genetics (for example, the "language acquisition 
device")? 
2. To what extent is this pattern development determined by ex-
perience, environment, and nutrition? 
3, What information is available from neural research that can be 
applied to educational practice? 
Until thesP. and related questions have been answered by science, the cen-
1Ibid. 
2Russell, Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, p. 155. 
3:sengelsdorf, "The Brain and Nervous System, 1 ' p. 22. 
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tral nervous system model will be of little use to educators. Further, 
since the neurological model has not yet yielded any educational pre-
scription for learning disability, its current efficacy in educational 
remediation can be regarded as nonexistent. 
According to the second, perceptual model as advanced by Frostig, 
Weprnan, Maslow, and others, deficits in perceptual abilities, such as 
figure-ground differentiation and auditory discrimination, interfere with 
learning and, therefore, constitute learning disabilities. 1 
Although this view of learning disability has much persuasiveness, 
there is no evidence correlating perceptual disability with poor achieve-
ment. In longitudinal studies comparing perceptual assessment scores of 
children with diagnosed perceptual disability to their scores on language 
arts achievement tests, no significant correlation was found. In other 
words, poor performance on perceptual tasks is not predictive of low aca-
demic achievement or of learning disability. Therefore, at the present 
time, it appears that the only diagnostic value of perceptual tests is in 
the area of acuity rather than in the area of reception. 2 
Studies have also been conducted which experimentally test the 
effects of perceptual remediation activities on learning disabled chil-
1 Janet W. Lerner, Theories Di osis Teachin Strate ies: Children 
with Learning Disabilities, 2nd ed, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976 , 
p. 154. 
2Ronald P. Colarusso, Hannah Martin, and Joseph Hartung, "Specific 
Visual Perceptual Skills as Long-Term Predictors of Academic Success," 
Journal of Learning Disabilities 8 (December 1975):651-655, 
r 
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dren. The results indicate that the development of "perceptual skills" 
merely helps a child perform better on subsequent perceptual tests but 
not better on academic achievement tests. 1 Unfortunately, this second 
model of learning disability also has not yielded an effective pre-
scription for remediation, 
'Ihe third model of learning disability is the most widely ac-
cepted view. According to Kirk, Cruickshank, Kephart, and others, def-
ici ts in "input-output" perceptual-memory-motor channels are the bases 
of learning disabilities~ An example of such a channel might be: visual 
input--visual memory association--manual expression output. This chan-
nel would be utilized, for example, in the following sequence: seeing 
a hammer, recognizing it as a hammer, making an "internal association" 
with a nail, and then picking up a nail from a group of objects. 2 
Although most proponents of this explanatory model suppose that 
the "channels" are actually neurophysiological in nature, it is not nee-
essary to regard them as such. One could argue, for example, that a 
~ channel is merely a hypothetical chain of events; a temporal analysis 
of an act of cognition. 
Because of its presumed dependence on neurophysiology, and be-
cause of its early espousal by physicians, the channel model character-
istically uses the medical idiom. For example, the term 'agnosia' means 
1Reported by Professor Harold M. Scholl, Department of Communication 
Sciences and Disorders, Montclair State College during a professional 
conference he conducted in Chicago on May 6, 1976. 
2 Le:rner, Children with Learning Disabilities, pp. 136-198. 
the inability to obtain information through an input sense organ even 
though that organ is not physiologically defective. Auditory agnosia, 
for example, is the inability to recognize sounds even though the sounds 
are heard. A person may thus hear a barking dog, that is, turn his head 
toward the stimulus, but not be able to recognize the sound as the bark 
of a dog. The prefix 'dys', meaning diseased, is commonly used to de-
scribe the various disabilities, for example: 
dyslexia - inability to read 
dysgraphia - inability to write legibly 
dyscalculia - inability to arithmetically compute 
dysfunctional channel - inability to effectively use an input-
output channel 
Terms such as 'dyslexia' in the federal definition thus reveal the biases 
of the select committee who formulated the de jure definition. 
Some advocates of this view (especially Kephart) emphasize the 
motoric basis of all learning. Accordingly, abilities such as space-
time orientation and figure-ground differentiation originate at the hap-
tic and kinesthetic levels. Auditory and visual figure-ground differ-
entiation, for example, rely on the child first being able to selective-
ly attend to one somatic sensation to the exclusion of others. By this 
view, temporal orientation also arises from motoric learning. For ex-
ample, the child learns to differentiate past, present, and future by 
differentiating his movements from a former position in space to a new 
position in space (as in walking a balance beam). The adherents of this 
view are the natural theoretic consorts of Piaget. 
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Dissatisfaction with the channel model arises mainly from two 
difficulties: misidentificaf.i.on and dissatisfaction with remediation 
results. 
1. misidentification - Poor performance on a perceptual-motor-
memory test is insufficient evidence of a learning disability. 
Further confirmation is required in the form of "clinical 
judgment" (introducing the undesirable element of subjectivity 
into the identification process). Kirk, for example, warns 
that low scores on his ITPA merely enable one to establish a 
tentative "diagnostic hypothesis" (on somewhat tenuous grounds).1 
2. efficacy of channel remediation activities - There is no evi-
dence that channel remediation exercises result in improved 
academic achievement. Channel remediation studies indicate 
that such training procedures do not "significantly improve" 
readiness skills, intelligence, academic achievement, or even 
Summary 
2 perceptual-motor performance. 
'Ihe field of lea:z:ning disability is laden with definitional con-
fusion and competing models of explanation. As a result, there is chaos 
at the schoolhouse level manifesting itself as misidentification, inef-
fectual remediation techniques, and professional anxiety and insecurity. 
'Ihe task at hand, therefore, is to propose an explanatory model 
which generates an operational definition of learning disability and 
1Sam.uel A. Kirk and Winifred D. Kirk, Psycholinguistic Learning Dis-
abilities: Diagnosis and Remediation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1971), p. 73, 
2Janet W. Lerner, 'Iheories, Diagnosis, Teaching Strategies: Children 
with Lea:rning Disabilities, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), 
p. 154. 
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which produces the following results: 
1. unites or eliminates competing models 
2. provides a method which increases the probability of correct 
identification (over the present methods) 
3. generates effective remediation strategies 
CHAPTER IV 
FORMULATING A PREDICTIVE HYPOTHESIS: 
THE SEMIOTICAL MODEL OF 
LANGUAGE DISABILITY 
In this chapter it will be argued that the three models of lea:rn-
ing disability discussed in the previous chapter can be reduced to a sin-
gle model. Also a fourth, language model will be introduced which dis-
places the other models by providing better identification criteria and 
more effective remediation strategies. Finally, a testable hypothesis 
will be advanced which is based on the language model. 
In the previous chapter the following three models were explored: 
1. the neurological model 
2. the perceptual model 
3. the input-output channel model 
It is theoretically possible to reduce the second and third explanatory 
models to the first model by defining the crucial terms of the second 
and third models (for example, 'auditory discrimination' and 1 perceptual-
motor-memory channel') to the basic terms of the first model (for example, 
'neuron' and 'intemeural hormone'). The resulting reduction would mere-
ly explain perception and channel input-output in terms of neurophysi-
ology. 
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Until the science of neurology completes the reduction, educators 
are left with the original three sets of identification criteria and re-
mediation strategies~ 
Is there an identification criterion of leailling disability which 
is more predictive of leailling disability than the criteria associated. 
with the three existing explanations? 
In the previous chapter, the following definition of leaining 
disability was tentatively proposed: a disorder in the process involved. 
in understanding or in using language. As previously noted, this pro-
posal has the effect of taking 'leaining disability' to mean semiotical 
disorder. If we hypothesize that language disorder (sign process de-
ficiency) is a sufficient identification criterion for learning dis-
ability, a companion hypothesis is also suggested.: remediation of leain-
ing disability should occur at the language level rather than, for ex-
ample, at the perceptual-memory-motor level. 
Since science is beginning to explain language disorder and lan-
guage acquisition in terms of neurophysiology, we could also hypothesize 
that the semiotical model of lea:rning disability is also reducible to the 
neurological model. However, the neurophysiological investigation of 
language is in an infant stage of development and, therefore, science is 
yet unable to completely explain language disorder in neurophysiological 
terms. 
As a result of cortical mapping, it is believed that the language 
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function resides within the left hemisphere of the brain. 1 One of the 
fundamental principles of biology is that function is related to struc-
ture. 'Iherefore, since in the human organism a unique structural char-
. 
acteristic has developed: the hemispherical brain (the "two brain phe-
nomenon ") , it can be assumed that some specialized functions may cor-
respond to this specialized structure. One of these functions is be-
lieved to be language (and, moreover, thought). 2 
When science is able to explain the relationship between lan-
guage and neurophysiology, the transformational grammarians may at last 
be able to point to an organic structure or process which corresponds 
to their now hypothetical "language acquisition device." 'Ihe hemis-
phericity of the human brain may also suggest the specialized biological 
structure which underlies the species specific, self-other dichotomy 
(Mead's "internalized conversation of gestures"). 
'Ihere is evidence that lack of hemispheric dominance is related 
to language disorder. In 1975 Marin and Saffran demonstrated, for ex-
ample, that sensory deficits cannot account for agnosic behavior. 'Iheir 
findings indicate that pathologies in cortical, hemispheric specializa-
tion account for agnosia.3 
1Robert D. Nebes, ·~rain: Right Hemisphere, Man's So-called Minor 
Hemisphere," Journal of Leaming Disabilities 8 (December 1975):626-628. 
2Ibid, 
3oscar S. M. Marin and Eleanor M. Saffran, "Anomia: Pathological 
Verbal Dominance," Journal of Leaming Disabilities 8 (December 197 5): 
624-625. 
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Several questions are suggested by this initial research. For 
example, do verbal tasks mainly involve the left hemisphere, whereas the 
so-called nonverbal tasks (such as the tasks that are presented on non-
verbal IQ tests) mainly involve the right hemisphere? Robert Nebes has 
already submitted evidence that the right hemisphere is a more important 
factor in "intelligence" than the left hemisphere. 1 Here we may at last 
find a physicalist basis for the ability-performance dichotomy. 
At this point, however, there is not sufficient empirical evi-
dence of correlation between learning disability and cerebral dominance 
pathology to infer a causal relationship. 2 Correlational evidence has 
thus far been generally limited to specific language disorders such as 
phonematic perceptual dysfunction and specific, motoric output dysfunc-
tion. 3 
Although the semiotical model of lea:r:ning disability suggests a 
neurological basis, it still may be left as an open question whether 
the "cause" of language disability is, wholly or in part, a neurological 
pathology. 
1Robert D. Nebes,. ''Brain: Right Hemisphere, Man's So-called Minor 
Hemisphere," Journal of Learning Disabilities 8 (December 197.5) :626-628. 
2Manuel R. Gomez, "Neurological Approach to Specific Language Dis-
ability," paper presented at the meeting of the Capital Area Branch of 
the Orton Society, Washington, D. C. , May 2, 1970 and published in the 
Orton Society Reprint Series, no. 30 (Pomfret, Conn.: Orton Society, 
1970), p. 27. 
3Richard L. Masland, ''Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Language Func-
tion," address given at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Orton 
Society, October 28, 1966, Rockefeller University, New York and pub-
lished in the Orton Society Reprint Series, no. 18 (Towson, Md.: Orton 
Society, 1967), pp. 1-30. 
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Empirical evidence for the relationship between lea:rning dis-
ability and language disorder is indirectly derived from remediation, 
efficacy studies and from comparative studies of the language repertories 
of lea:rning disabled children and normal children rather than from 
neurological investigations. 
For example, efficacy studies have shown that lea:rning disabled 
students are most effectively remediated by improving their language 
ability. Harold Scholl reported that in such a recent study, four groups 
of lea:rning disabled students were treated as follows: 
1. control group - given no special remediation 
2. channel group - given perceptual-memory-motor training 
3. perceptual group - given perceptual training 
4. language group - given intensive language training 
At the end of the experiment, only the language group showed significanct 
'h . ad . h" t 1 grow~ in ac emic ac ievemen • 
In November, 1975, Elisabeth Wiig and Eleanor Semel of Boston 
University conducted similar research conce:rning the relationship between 
lea:rning disability and language. They found more expressive language 
deficits in lea:rning disabled children than were exhibited by the nor-
mal 2 peer group. 
1Reported by Professor Harold M. Scholl, Department of Communication 
Sciences and Disorders, Montclair State College during a professional 
conference he conducted in Chicago on May 6, 1976. 
2ELisabeth H. Wiig and Eleanor M. Semel, "Productive Language Abili-
ties in Lea:rning Disabled Adolescents," J oumal of Lea:rning Disabilities 
8 (November 1975):578. 
r 
Their research was limited to adolescent expressive language pro-
duction and did not attempt to measure receptive, nonverbal, or pragmatic 
aspects of semiotic. Their study must be praised, however, for including 
the prosodic characteristics of language (musical aspects). 
One of their observations is especially noteworthy: 
There remains ••• a paucity of investigations which further ex-
plore the nature and extent of the reported deficits • no sin-
gle, standardized test incorporated tasks sensitive to all ••• 
language abilities.1 
Suppose, however, that we were able to construct an exhaustive 
language test "Which measured all aspects of language repertory. The re-
sulting raw scores would probably distribute themselves normally (in the 
normal curve sense). We might subsequently classify learning disabled 
children in one of two ways: 
1. as all children in a specified age range who obtain a score 
lower than a particular raw score on the test 
2. as all children in a specified age range who fall below a par-
ticular percentile 
Accepting either of these operational definitions of 'learning 
disability' would have the advantage of implying remediation. '!he first 
definition has the advantage of eventually allowing educators to eradi-
cate learning disability from a group. Accepting the second definition, 
however, has the effect of forever having learning disabled children 
with us. 
1Ibid., pp. 578-579. 
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Both definitions allow a new perspective of learning disab~lity, 
remediation, exceptionality, and general education. Accordingly, from 
the point of view of the linguistic turn, the only difference between 
LD child.ren and non-LD children is a difference of degree in their semi-
otical competence. Adopting the linguistic ontology suggests a similar 
distinction between all exceptional children and their normal peers. 
From this point of view, labels lose much of their significance and the 
task of education becomes: increasing the semiotical competence of all 
students, 
The preceding analysis suggests the following hypothesis: learn-
ing disabled children generally exhibit a lower level of language pro-
ficiency than their normal peers, There are at least two ways of form-
ulating this hypothesis in the form of a test-conditions-test-results 
conditional: 
1, If a set of children has been partitioned into two groups, LD 
and non-LD, according to traditional methods (such as IQ-achieve-
ment discrepancy; low performance on identification tests such 
as the VMI, ITPA, and Bender; and professional consensus) then 
the incidence of language disorders in the LD group will be 
greater than the incidence of language disorders in the non-LD 
group. 
2. If a set of children has been partitioned as designated above 
then low performance on language tests will be a better dis-
criminator of the LD trait than low performance on traditional 
identification tests. 
r 
I 
The hypothesis can be tested in at least one of two ways: 
, 
1. An ex post facto analysis of performance on tests which are 
considered to be "language-free" compared with performance on 
tests which are judged to be relatively language dependent. 
Since no test is truly language-free, there is an ever present 
problem of contamination using this method. 
2. A comparative study of the performance of LD and non-LD students 
on an objective test which is designed to assess semiotical rep-
ertory. Unfortunately, no test presently exists which compre-
hensively measures all semiotical aspects, including nonverbal 
and pragmatic aspects. 
The role of philosophy in solving the problem of leaniing dis-
ability has now been demonstrated. The definitions and theories of 
leaniing disability have been philosophically analyzed. Also, a lin-
guistic ontology has been postulated which promises to be productive in 
terms of identification and remediation. In short, the problem of leani-
ing disability should thus be in a more science-acceptable form. There-
fore, the question of leaniing disability can now be handed over to em-
pirical science. 
r 
CHAPTER V 
TESTING A HYPOTHESIS: 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF LANGUAGE COMPETENCE 
IN NORMAL AND LEARNING DI SABLED CHILDREN 
Introduction 
The following exploratory study was conducted to verify (confirm 
or disconfirm) the hypothesis that language competence is a better dif-
ferentiator between learning disabled children and normal children than 
perceptual-motor-memory competence. 
As pointed out in the previous chapters, many schools are faced 
with the problem of inaccurate identification of learning disabled 
children. 1 Traditional methods have differentiated between normal and 
learning disabled children by the use of perceptual-motor-memory tests 
(for example, the Frostig Test) and have attempted to remediate the 
identified learning disabled children through the implementation of 
perceptual-motor-memory training activities such as Frostig exercises. 
However, these traditional methods of identification and remediation 
1Samuel A. Kirk and John Elkins, "Characteristics of Children En-
rolled in the Child Service Demonstration Centers," Journal of Learning 
Disabilities 8 (November 1975):630-637, 
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appear unsatisfactory because efficacy studies have revealed the inef-
fectiveness of such methods. 1 
Recently, researchers such as Elisabeth Wiig have found evidence 
that learning disability generally manifests itself as a language de-
f . . 2 iciency. These researchers maintain that remediation of lea:rning dis-
ability should focus on improving language competence. 
In the present investigation it is expected that if a group of 
learning disabled children and a group of normal children were both 
given a language test and a perceptual-motor-memory test, the language 
test would be a better differentiator between the two groups than the 
perceptual-motor-memory test. The purpose of the present exploratory 
study is to tentatively establish that the language model (that is, 
the semiotical model) of learning disability is effective in identi-
fying learning disabled children. If learning disabled children do, 
in fact, exhibit language deficiencies then an apparent remediation 
prescription is to improve the language competence of such children. 
The general hypothesis to be tested is that language competence is 
~a better differentiator between learning disabled children and normal 
1Ronald P. Colarusso, Hannah Martin, and Joseph Hartung, "Specific 
Visual Perceptual Skills as Long-Term Predictors of Academic Success," 
Journal of Lea:rning Disabilities 8 (December 1975):651-655;and Stephen 
C. Larsen, Dorothy Rogers, and Virginia Sowell, "The Use of Selected 
Perceptual Tests in Differentiating between Normal and Learning Disabled 
Children," Joumal of Learning Disabilities 9 (February 1976) :85-89. 
2Elisabeth H. Wiig and Eleanor M. Semel, "Productive Language Abili-
ties in Leaming Disabled Adolescents," Journal of Learning Disabilities 
8 (November 1975):578. 
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children than perceptual-motor-memory competence. 
METHOD 
Hypotheses Tested 
'Ihe principal purpose of this study was to test the following 
hypotheses: 
Given a group of normal subjects and a matched group of learning 
disabled subjects: 
1. 'Ihe mean score of the normal subjects on a language test 
(the Preschool Language Scale) will be significantly greater 
than the mean score of the learning disabled subjects. 
2. The normal subjects will obtain a significantly higher mean 
vocabulary age on a standardized vocabulary test (the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test) than the learning disabled subjects. 
3. The label "learning disabled" will correlate significantly 
more highly to low scores on the language test (Preschool 
Language Scale) than to low scores on perceptual-motor-
memory tests (such as the Purdue Perceptual-Motor Survey). 
Subjects 
'Ihree hundred and ninety-seven subjects were selected from four-
~teen first grade classrooms in an upper middle class suburban school 
district. Mentally retarded, physically impaired, emotionally dis-
turbed, bilingual, non-English speaking, hearing impaired, and visually 
handicapped subjects were excluded from the sample. Less than five 
percent of the subjects were from minority groups. '!he mean IQ score 
of the subjects was 115 (ranging from 84 to 165) as measured by the 
Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test. The lea:rning disabled subjects had 
been previously diagnosed or were in the process of being ref erred as 
r 
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potentially learning disabled. The ITPA, WISC, Wepman, Bender, pro-
fessional judgment, and IQ-achievement discrepancy were utilized as 
criteria for learning disability diagnosis. Normal subjects had no 
previous history of learning disabilities. Utilizing the above selec-
tion criteria, 25 subjects were identified as learning disabled and 
372 were classified as normal. 
Procedure 
All subjects were individually given three tests: the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test, the Purdue Perceptual-Motor Survey, and the 
Preschool Language Scale, The first two tests are commonly used and 
have professionally accepted levels of reliability and validity. 1 
Instruments 
The Purdue Perceptual-Motor Survey measures body image, manual 
dexterity, body movement, and eye-motor coordination. The test thus 
assesses channels of perceptual-motor functioning. The Peabody Pie-
ture Vocabulary Test, inter alia, is regarded as an assessment of a 
child's vocabulary competence. 
The Preschool Language Scale contains five subtests: the first 
four mainly assess language competence (syntax, following directions, 
vocabulary, and vocal integration). However, the fifth subtest as-
sesses auditory-visual-sequential memory. The Preschool Language 
Scale was produced in 1969 by Luceille Werner, Director of a Title III 
1
oscar Krisen Buros, ed. The Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook 
(Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press, 1972), pp. 417 and 874, 
r 
ESEA project entitled "Early Prevention of School Failure." 'Ihe test 
was validated as follows. 'Ihe Pearson correlation coefficient com-
paring pre- and post-test scores resulted in a reliability correlation 
of .773 at a .001 level of significance. Since the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Test predominantly measures intellectual language func-
tions, it was selected for a concurrent validity check. A close sim-
ilarity exists between the content of the language inventory and the 
content of the Stanford-Binet. 'Ihe Pearson correlation coefficient 
comparing the language inventory raw scores with the Binet MA was .776 
which was significant at the .001 level. 1 
Results 
'Ihe results of the study are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
In Table 1 we see that, as anticipated, the mean language score of the 
normal group was greater than the mean language score of the learning 
disabled group. 
Table 2 presents the average result of computing the discrepancy 
.\in months between the chronological age and the "vocabulary age" 
(Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test mental age) for each subject. For ex-
ample, if a subject has a chronological age of 71 months and the sub-
ject has a raw score on the Peabody Test which corresponds to a mental 
age equivalent of 87 months, his chronological/mental age discrepancy 
would be +16 months. 'Ihe +16 indicates that his vocabulary age is 16 
111Preschool Language Scale Manual," (Mimeographed.) Available 
from Peotone School District 207-U, 114 N. Second Street, Peotone, 
Illinois 60468. 
~. 
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months greater than his chronological age. As expected, we see t~at 
the normal group exhibited a greater vocabulary competence (+15.02 
months above their chronological age) than the leaming disabled group 
(+3.76 months above their chronological age). The significance of 
this finding is the magnitude of the difference between the learning 
disabled group's performance and the normal group's performance. The 
fact that the learning disabled group scored above their chronological 
age (+3.76) would not be surprising to those who work with learning 
disabled children. One of the characteristics of such children is 
that, while they often score above the fiftieth percentile (because 
of high IQ or socio-economic status), they often perform significantly 
lower than their normal peer group on the same test. 
In Table 3, the correlations that were found between low score 
on various tests and the learning disabilities attribute are presented. 
As anticipated, it was found that poor performance on the language test 
was better correlated to learning disability than poor performance on 
the memory or perceptual-motor tests. Therefore, language competence 
appears to be a better predictor of learning disability than perceptual-
motor-memory competence. 
TABLE 1 
Results of Language Test 
Group N Language Inventory Standard Variance 
Mean Score Deviation 
LD 25 27.68 7.04 49,56 
Normal 372 34.79 5.32 28.30 
r 
TABLE 2 
Mean Discrepancy between Chronological Age and Vocabulary Age 
Group N Mean Discrepancy in Months Standard Variance 
between CA and MA Deviation 
LD 25 +3.76 15.67 245.55 
Normal 372 +15.02 11.93 142.32 
TABLE 3 
Correlations between LD and Low Test Performance 
Low Score on Low Score on Low Score on 
Language Subtests Memory Subtest Perceptual-Motor Survey 
LD .35 .19 .16 
The first null hypothesis tested (represented in Table 1) was 
that the two mean language scores were the same. The null hypothesis 
was rejected at the .05 level of significance. The following t-test 
~was used because the variances were unequal and the leailling disabled 
group was small (less than JO). 
t = and 
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The second null hypothesis tested (represented in Table 2) was 
that the two mean discrepancies were the same. The null hypothesis 
was rejected at the .05 level of significance by using the t-test de-
scribed above. 
The third null hypothesis tested (represented in Table 3) was 
that there was no difference among the correlation coefficients yielded 
by the point-biserial Pearson product-moment correlation formula. 
Using a two-tailed test of normal distribution, the null hypothesis 
was rejected at the .05 level of significance. The language correla-
tion of • 35 is considered to be a "moderate" correlation whereas the 
memory and perceptual-motor correlations of .19 and .16 respectively, 
are considered to be "low" correlations. 
In order to display the results in an additional form, Figures 
1 and 2 are presented. 
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Summarizing the obtained results, we find that: learning dis-
abled children generally do not achieve as well as normal students on 
language tasks, learning disabled children generally do not have as 
good a vocabulary repertory as normal children, and performance on 
language tests yieldsa better correlation to leaming disability than 
performance on perceptual-motor-memory tests. 
Discussion 
The results of this study offer support for the general hypo-
~.thesis that language competence is a good predictor of learning disabil-
ity and a better predictor than the traditional criterion of perceptual-
motor-memory competence. 
It should be noted that al though the evldence produced by this 
study supports the semiotical theory of learning disability, confinna-
tion of the semiotical theory is limited by at least three verification 
difficulties. Fi~st, the tests used do not comprehensively measure 
semiotical functioning (including semantic, syntactic, pragmatic, pro-
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sodic, and nonverbal factors). Secondly, there is an inherent contam-
ination problem in language and nonlanguage tests. The perceptua.1-
motor-memory tests depend on language, if only in the establishment 
of the directions. Also, the language tests clearly depend on memory, 
perception, and motor components. Thirdly, partitioning a group of 
students into learning disabled and normal subgroups is an uncertain 
process at best, often resulting in the identification of false pos-
itives and false negatives. Therefore, any attempt to accurately 
coITelate learning disability to test performance is limited by the 
accuracy of the given partitioning process. 
It is recognized that additional statistical testing (for ex-
ample, partial coITelation analyses) could have been conducted. How-
ever, due to the limitations of the exploratory nature of this study, 
such analyses were not conducted. Based on the exploratory data re-
ported here, however, it appears that further statistical testing is 
waITanted. 
Conclusion 
The verification of the semiotical theory of learning disabil-
ity now rests upon weak empirical evidence. As further positive evi-
dence is collected, the probability in favor of the truth of the semi-
otical hypothesis will increase, The scientist and philosopher will 
err, however, the moment that they delude themselves or others into 
unconditional or final acceptance of this or any other hypothesis. 
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Bertrand Russell, a philosopher who spent much of his life ex-
ploring the foundations of mathematics (supposedly the most certain of 
all knowledge), once observed: 
No one should be certain of anything. If you are certain, you 
are certainly wrong, because nothing deserves certainty.1 
This problem of certainty thus brings us to the limits of philosophy 
in general and to the limits of philosophy in education. 
1 Russell, Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, p. 14. 
We must do away with all explanation and 
description alone must take its place. 
Investigations (109) 
CHAPTER VI 
REFLECTING ON THE LANDSCAPE: 
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION 
This work will be concluded by reviewing 'What has been presented 
in the previous chapters and by reflecting upon the inherent limitations 
of philosophy in education. 
A new role for philosophy in education was explored through a 
partial reconstruction of philosophy, the history of philosophy, and 
various educational disciplines on the basis of "the linguistic tum" 
which was described as: the ontological attitude that language is the 
basis for all reality, 
It was shown how taking the linguistic tum suggests a new 
criterion of meaning which displaces the empiricist criterion of mean-
ing. It was further shown how adopting the linguistic tum can result 
in postulating: a new definition of 'man'; a new distinction between 
science and the humanities; and a reinterpretation of the value and 
meaning of metaphysics, theology, and religion. 
In the process of exploring "metaphysical semantics" a neuro-
physiological basis was suggested for Mead's internalized self-other 
70 
dichotomy and a confirmation-falsification reduction was proposed for 
'God exists' • 
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A paradigm application of the linguistic tu:rn in education was 
presented. The example field was special education and learning dis-
ability in particular. The analysis included a critique of the current 
federal de jure definition of lea:rning disability as well as the de facto 
definition of learning disability presently used by the practitioners in 
the field. 
Three competing theories of lea:rning disability were examined and 
a fourth was proposed: that learning disability can be described as an 
"unacceptable" level of semiotical proficiency with respect to the con-
tinuum of semiotical proficiencies exhibited by a reference population. 
Finally, a predictive hypothesis was proposed concerning the re-
lationship between language and learning disability. The problem of 
learning disability was then handed over to empirical science. Handing 
over the problem to science brings us to the limit of philosophy. What 
is the limit of philosophy in education? 
An art critic might point out that baroque painting typically 
has a diagonal organization of its elements extending into the back-
ground of the painting. The art critic is not thereby pointing out 
something that was literally hidden from us previously. The philos-
opher is much like this art critic because: 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden 
because of their simplicity and familiarity. Philosophy simply, 
puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces any-
thing. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain. For what is hidden , •• is of no interest to us.1 
72 
When philosophy places everything before us, it does so from a new per-
spective. Only the perspective is new, not the elements of what is 
seen. The new perspective is a description of things already before us, 
Wittgenstein's metaphor suggests the limit of philosophy in 
education. The descriptive function of philosophy is also its limit. 
Metaphysical "explanation" is not explanation in the empirical sense 
(prediction and postdiction). Metaphysical description is a metaphor-
ical representation of those things that transcend public experience. 
Since it was the intent of this study to propose for education 
a description of a linguistic ontology, a system of metaphysical seman-
tics, and the limits of language and thought then everything said which 
was of value in realizing this goal was said metaphorically and not 
designatively {empirically). 
11udwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G, E. M. 
Anscombe {New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), p, ,50e. 
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